The "Energy Turnaround" is not a vision anymore -it is reality. With an analysis of blackouts and important disturbances in Europe since 2003 this paper describes the sequence of events and challenges restoring the grid. Since in most of the disturbances described renewables have been involved the paper describes concrete problems and impacts on protection and control. After every blackout rules, transmission and distribution codes as well as national regulations have been adaptedsometimes causing new challenges and problems. The paper sharpens the picture and shows concrete measures how to enhance the reliability of the grid penetrated more and more with distributed energy resources. This publication does not just cover huge blackouts but also experiences in utilities and with system integrators.
Example Germany
This paper describes examples from all over Europe but is also focusing on some developments in Germany. Germany is one of the main drivers, especially after the decision to shut down nuclear power stations in March 2011 until the end of 2022 [1] . Already now the amount of energy from renewables is high-e.g. 67% of entire load on 3 rd of October in 2013 [2] . 
The Year of Blackouts-2003
In summer 2003 several blackouts occurred around the world . But this should be described later. Even some of the blackouts occurred are related to the "energy turnaround" and should be described more detailed.
3 Disturbances Caused by Energy Turnaround ("Energiewende")
Introduction
The term "energy turnaround" became very popular after the decision of the German government influenced by the Fukushima accident on 11 th of March in 2011. The term in German language is "Energiewende".
Italian Blackout 2003
Already one of the 2003-blackouts was influenced by a change in energy-the Italian (2003-09-28, Fig. 3 [4] ). The initial situation was a high load in the network at night (28 GW, 6.5 GW have been imported from Switzerland) and a limited reserve. At 3:01 a.m. a 380-kV-high-load line touched a tree and tripped, no reclosing possible. 24 minutes later 2 overloaded 380-kV-lines tripped as well. The stability limit of the UCTE grid was reached. Even with massive load shedding the frequency continued to decrease [4] because of further trips of frequency relays and loss of excitation. Nevertheless as one of the main reasons the shutdown of 3 nuclear power stations and the resulting lack of reserve was described. As a result UCTE reviewed the rules and guidelines [4] , one of the 380-kV-lines (Luckmanier) in Switzerland was equipped with monitoring equipment to increase possible load [5] .
Loss of Generation Wind 2004-01-29
A 3-phase line fault happened in the German region Oldenburg. The voltage collapsed. At this time 1.1 GW wind power have been switched off immediately according to utilities requirements at this time. [6] As a result the grid codes have been adapted.
Disturbance in Switzerland 2006 -Huge Amount of Data [7]
At the Swiss Rail (SBB) on 2006-05-22 2 of 3 lines have been out of service for maintenance. The 3 rd line tripped. [7] 18 000 messages reached the control center within 1 hour. 3400 of them had been critical but at least 4 messages have been important to avoid the disturbance. Lessons learned:
 Measures to handle messages necessary  Filters necessary
Missing reactive Power in Poland 2006 [8] In case of significantly high demand in summer, during long hightemperature period, Polish system has too small margin for secure operation and so it crashed on 2006-06-26. Very often only active power is paid for. On 2006-06-26 in Poland the systems crashed because also of a lack of reactive power. So the required margin can and should be restored through eliminating local reactive power deficits by installation of reactive power sources. Till the margin is restored the voltages and reactive power balances has to be monitored and proper actions undertook as  Required reactive power reserve has to be kept even at the cost of lowering active power output (TSO)  Higher reactive demand has to be immediately compensated (DSO)  TSO should be informed about generated units states  Temporary blocking of automatic transformer tap changer control was introduced Some TSOs considered especially the last hint, but not all.
UCTE Disturbance 2006-11-04
The base for this event was a scheduled opening of a line to allow the move of a ship An n-1 calculation for this event was done when the request was received in October 2006 but not directly before the operation. So the line 380-kV-line Diele-Conneforde was switched off and the load shifted as expected. 25 minutes later the load increased unexpected (100 MW) and additional measures have been necessary (Fig. 5) . The coupling in Landesbergen was closed to decrease load. But the load increased further and so the lines LandesbergenWehrendorf and Bechterdissen-Elsen as well as DipperzGroßkrotzenburg tripped within some seconds. This caused a domino effect -like a zip from Germany to Austria (Fig. 6 ). 
What can be wrong
When wind farms are connected to the grid this is very often done at a later stage. Fig. 9 shows an example from Germany. 
Generally recognized codes of practice are valid
Relaxation oscillations caused the disturbance shown in Fig. 10 . Fig. 10 Burning VT in Germany The damping resistance (Fig. 11) was mounted in the wrong manner-the codes of practice have not been considered. Fig. 12 Damaged tower Fig. 12 shows one of 5 towers damaged by whirlwind in Germany in 2012. The connected medium voltage grid shows almost no reaction -because of the huge amount of connected wind farms (Fig. 13) . 
DER stabilizes the grid

Re-dispatch
In general we observe much more re-dispatches in the grids.
What was an exception in the past (2 per year in 2003) became normality (1024 events per year demanding further actions in 2011) [13] Fig. 16 Number of re-dispatches [13] This has an impact on n-1 safety.
Examples for planning errors
In general we observe a decreasing quality of planning work done. The interest for technical background is sometimes missing For instance there was a protection device, just connected to 230-VAC-power. Asking why this was donebecause it is written in protection device's datasheet that this is possible.
Problems in UCTE grid
The huge amount of renewables in some countries changes the European load flow [14] .
Fig. 17
Load flow [14] This has an impact on stability in other grids-so for instance the Czech TSO claimed huge problems with this huge amount of power [15].
Blackout because of huge amount of data?
Even "just data" can be a risk for grid's stability. In Austria a huge amount of broadcasts between controllers have been sent out again as broadcasts and blocked the communication infrastructure on 2013-05-13. Several power plants and substations had to be manned to observe and control them [16] .
Précis and Outlook
This paper showed disturbances in several countries and risks observed. The European grid is extremely stable but the risks and dangers peril this level. It is challenging task but worth to take care about it.
